

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**

**Newport, Rhode Island**

**"FORWARD... FROM THE SEA," WHERE DOES THE  
COAST GUARD FIT IN?**


*by*

*Davalee G. Norton*

**LCDR, U.S. COAST GUARD**

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the U.S. Coast Guard.



Signature *DG Norton*

14 June 1996

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"FORWARD...FROM THE SEA"  
WHERE DOES THE COAST GUARD FIT IN?

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## **"Forward...From the Sea," Where Does the Coast Guard Fit In?**

### **INTRODUCTION AND THESIS**

Background. As the U.S. Navy shifts emphasis from the blue water Soviet threat scenario upon which the existing fleet is based, to "green" and "brown" water operations as they come "Forward... From the Sea," one lesson seems forgotten. The Coast Guard fleet seems conspicuously absent from the planning process as seen in the Navy's vision "Forward...From the Sea." In this day and age of downsizing, budgetary constraints, and using joint forces, it is important for each service to know where it fits in and not duplicate efforts.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed a supporting National Military Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which involves more peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations, and Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Budget restrictions will most likely continue despite the nation's ever increasing involvement in nation-state disagreements world wide.

Although scientists normally give a narrower meaning to the term "littoral," the Navy uses it to delineate that region from around 200 nautical miles seaward to 60 statute miles inland.<sup>1</sup> The Coast Guard has performed and continues to perform littoral operations internationally and has participated in every war and conflict in the history of the U.S. The Coast Guard trains to perform close-in blockades, searches, seizures, and inspections of both commercial and private vessels. All of these capabilities could support the Navy's "Forward...From the Sea" vision.

An Operational Commander tasked with the planning and execution of an Operational

Plan, should consider the Coast Guard to fill the gaps in the U.S. Navy's "Forward...From the Sea." The Coast Guard is a choice that most Operational Commanders may not consider as the Coast Guard is not prominently addressed. It can, and should be used to fill the areas not addressed. General Colin Powell stated "The Coast Guard provides National Command Authorities a unique instrument in the nation's National Security tool bag."<sup>2</sup> The need for the inclusion of Coast Guard in naval planning is as relevant today as it was twenty-five years ago. The United States Coast Guard possesses tremendous potential to further both global and U.S. interests. This potential will not be reached unless more unity of effort is achieved by both maritime forces.

### **"...FROM THE SEA" AND "FORWARD...FROM THE SEA"**

To gain a better insight in the consideration, or lack thereof, of the Coast Guard in the Navy's vision, it is important to understand the concept of "...From the Sea," and "Forward...From the Sea." In 1992, the Navy-Marine Corps paper "...From the Sea" defined the strategic concept intended to carry the Navy and Marine Corps beyond the Cold War and into the twenty-first century. It changed the focus and priorities for the U.S. Navy away from blue water operations on the sea to operations in the littorals that influence events ashore.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of U.S. naval forces remains to project the power and influence of the nation across the sea to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war. "Forward...From the Sea" updates and expands the strategic concept articulated in the 1992 paper to address specifically the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts. "Forward...From the Sea" amplifies the scope of the strategic concept while confirming the course and speed for the naval service as defined in the original document.<sup>4</sup>

"...From the Sea" was the first step in demonstrating how the Navy and Marine Corps responded to the challenges of a new security environment. "Forward...From the Sea"

evolved from a major review of strategy and force requirements that resulted in a shift in DOD's focus to new dangers, principally aggression by regional powers and the necessity for our military forces to be able to rapidly project decisive military power to protect vital U.S. interests and defend friends and allies. This new strategy is based on the premise that it is in the world's littoral waters where the naval service, operating from platforms in international waters, can influence events ashore in support of our interests.<sup>5</sup>

Of equal importance to what is in the Navy's vision for future operations is what is absent from the plan. The plan does not address the Navy's role in close-in blockades, enforcement of laws and treaties with other nations, or the need to place smaller vessels in the contiguous waters of any country. As an Operational Commander, this area is extremely vital, especially in littoral operations and OOTW, in planning and executing nearly every operation where vessels other than combatants are transiting the waters.

Deja Vu or Historical Precedence: A lesson previously learned was OPERATION MARKET TIME during the Vietnam war. Early in the war, the naval contribution to the effort was negligible. This changed in February of 1965 after an Army pilot sighted a camouflaged ship lying in Vung Ro Bay on South Vietnam's central coast.<sup>6</sup> Viet Cong (VC) fire repelled three attempts to land combined US/South Vietnam (SVN) ground troops at the site of the trawler. This single incident led the Navy's first large scale operational involvement in the war, and the birth of OPERATION MARKET TIME.

Disruption of the maritime supply line to the communist insurgency quickly became a priority. Within weeks it became evident that the SVN Junk Fleet was not capable of the task. The sheer numbers were overwhelming. Suspect coastal traffic was nearly impossible to distinguish from the more than 50,000 registered, legitimate civilian craft that plied the coastal waters of South Vietnam.<sup>7</sup> What was needed was a relatively stable,

fast, well armed, shallow draft patrol boat capable of round the clock operations for days on end. The U.S. Navy had nothing to fill this bill. This was no great revelation for the Navy. They had been aware of this void ever since the disestablishment of the PT Boat Squadrons following World War II. In a 1964 article written by U.S. Navy RADM John Harllee, this fact was emphasized. He was prophetic when he wrote that small warships would be needed for the control of coastal and inner island waters and rivermouths of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.<sup>8</sup>

In response to inquiries made by the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Coast Guard reported that he had exactly what the Navy needed. On 22 April 1965, the Coast Guard and Navy agreed that seventeen Coast Guard Patrol Boats (WPB's) would join the "Swift" boats the Navy had ordered for OPERATION MARKET TIME. Although the Swifts were smaller, faster, and more shallow in draft, they were little more than day boats with limited endurance and unable to keep to the sea in heavy weather.<sup>9</sup> With the South Vietnamese Junk Fleet unable or unwilling to interdict coastal traffic, the Swifts limited in capability, and the Destroyer Escorts patrolling further out to sea, the Coast Guard WPB's became the backbone of OPERATION MARKET TIME.

OPERATION MARKET TIME showed just how important a vessel could be to disrupt the supply lines, sort out the masses of legitimate vessel traffic, and stop illegal cargo from being smuggled in. Until the need arose, the Navy had made no plans for this mission. Interestingly enough, "...From the Sea," and "Forward...From the Sea" both fail to address the same issues.

Although the Navy is shifting emphasis to littoral warfare as evidenced in "Forward...From the Sea," it appears instead they are moving to a triad of strike



combatants: submarine (TRIDENT & SEAWOLF), carrier (NIMITZ with stealth aircraft), and Aegis equipped surface ships.<sup>10</sup> The Navy fleet consists of a few, very large, high cost combatants. These vessels were primarily built for blue water power projection and sea control and possess limited utility in regional or littoral scenarios of the future. Although the Coast Guard may be able to fill some of the voids, a naval component to a CINC may be unaware of Coast Guard capabilities.

### **COAST GUARD MISSIONS AND ROLES**

The Coast Guard is, by statute "a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times".<sup>11</sup> The requirement states the Coast Guard will "maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war".<sup>12</sup> It is also specifically authorized to assist DOD in the performance of any activity for which the Coast Guard is especially qualified.<sup>13</sup> The U.S. Coast Guard is the only U.S. Armed Force not encompassed in DOD and the only Armed Force with both domestic and national security roles.

The Coast Guard has four broad mission areas: (1) safety, (2) law enforcement, (3) environmental protection, and (4) political-military. Today the political-military mission area would be considered as supporting national security while the other three mission areas directly support a strong and healthy U.S. economy and environment. Because of the globally-connected world, and because of the increasing role of the military in OOTW, these Coast Guard mission areas have utility in supporting the National Military Strategy as well.<sup>14</sup>

Each of the four mission areas is composed of several functions or operating programs. Many of these functions benefit more than one mission area, such as the Coast Guard's

port safety and security function. The Coast Guard remains versatile, multimission focused, and can therefore alter one function to emphasize another. (SEE APPENDIX A)

### **INTEGRATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD**

In the study conducted by Captain Stubbs at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, a survey question asked "What specialized service could the Coast Guard perform for DOD in the next century . . . is there a gap in DOD capabilities that the Coast Guard could fill?"<sup>15</sup> The responses ranged from consolidating the Navy's naval control of shipping mission into the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) command structure to assuming responsibilities for "the low end of the high-low mix of ships." Additional responses addressed providing capabilities for which the Navy does not have sufficient resources, and presence in areas of lesser threat, and noncombat search and rescue (SAR).<sup>16</sup>

There is widespread agreement between DOD and the Coast Guard that the current Coast Guard missions will continue to be valid and useful. Where they fit in with the Navy and DOD is still under debate. The current NWP-39 (*Coastal Warfare Doctrine*) includes a maritime interdiction mission area with the use of Coast Guard boarding teams as a matter of routine. Their previous omission in U.S. Central Command's operational plans highlighted this shortcoming.

During the November 1995 NAVGARD Board, the VCNO made a formal offer for the Coast Guard to join with the Navy in the development of surface vessels for the twenty-first century. The VCNO stated: "It would be...inexcusable..." for the USN and USCG to not align themselves with regard to future ship procurements.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, the Commander in Chief, of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, has requested Coast Guard participation in the Western Hemisphere Group (WHG).<sup>18</sup> The WHG was established primarily for missions now termed by DOD as Military Operations Other Than War

(MOOTW) such as migrant interdiction, counter-narcotics and engagement.<sup>19</sup> For these ongoing missions, it appears promising for more instances of increased joint MOOTW by Navy and Coast Guard forces.

The recent deployment of the USCGC DALLAS to the Mediterranean and Black Sea was a chance for the Coast Guard to use its capabilities and expertise in order to expand U.S. peacetime engagement with Mediterranean and black Sea littoral nations while exercising interoperability with C6F assets.<sup>20</sup> USCGC DALLAS met or exceeded all C6F objectives and its complementary and nonredundant expertise and capabilities supported the CINC's peacetime engagement and surge requirements. USCGC DALLAS was requested by CINCEUR to "expand U.S. interaction with littoral nations beyond traditional (U.S. Navy) Mil-to-Mil, and expand U.S. presence and contact with nations for which U.S. Navy warship visits are not yet appropriate".<sup>21</sup>

Memorandum of Understanding: As political, strategic and fiscal changes are occurring, the Coast Guard participation in Defense operations competes with other statutory missions. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation agreed in writing under a Memorandum of Understanding titled Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resource in Support of the National Military Strategy. This document signed in October 1995 delineates and lists Coast Guard national defense roles, missions, and functions. This MOU became a reference for joint force assessments and joint maritime planning, training, and operations. It did not, however, impose programming or budgeting obligations on either department.<sup>22</sup>

The first annex of this MOU pertains to Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). MIO is a resource-intensive, low-threat operation that requires specialized training and a sustained presence in the area of operations. MIO is conducted to enforce the seaward portion of

certain sanctions against another nation and may include stopping, boarding, searching, diverting, or redirecting vessel traffic. The Coast Guard maintains many capabilities and platforms directly related to MIO in the routine execution of peacetime missions such as maritime law enforcement, trained boarding personnel, capable cutters and aircraft attuned to surveillance, interception and boarding activities.<sup>23</sup> Currently the Navy uses Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) deployed on Naval Ships to perform this MIO mission. Maritime Interdiction has always been, and always will be the forte of the U.S. Coast Guard. No one does it better. The LEDETs deployed in DESERT SHIELD were the nucleus of the MIO operations and continued through the DESERT STORM phase into current operations today.

The second annex of the MOU pertains to Environmental Defense Operations. This annex addresses massive marine pollution incidents, such as the Iraqi-generated crude oil spill during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. These incidents have the potential to disrupt defense operations, impact national economies, and do enormous damage to natural resources in the littoral zone. As the lead Federal agency charged with preventing and responding to marine pollution incidents, the Coast Guard is organized and equipped to command, coordinate, and provide forces to respond to major spills or environmental disasters.<sup>24</sup>

The third annex addresses the Deployed Port Operations, Security and Defense (DPOSD). DPOSD ensures port and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats, terrorist actions, and safety deficiencies that would be threats to support and resupply operations. It also ensures the safe and efficient operation of all vessels and facilities within the port, harbor, and harbor approach environment. The Coast Guard maintains both the proficiency and platforms directly applicable to DPOSD, and maintains currency of

experience through routine peacetime operations.<sup>25</sup>

Although this MOU between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation is an excellent start to establishing the roles and missions the Coast Guard and can provide in support of DOD missions, it still leaves many areas unaddressed. As an Operational Commander, this MOU provides options for employment of USCG forces and does define some substantive uses for the Coast Guard.

Nevertheless, employment of the Coast Guard in certain crucial areas may never occur to the Operational Commander. One reason may be that there are not enough Coast Guard assets to train regularly with U.S. Navy units to develop C<sup>2</sup>. Another reason may be the lack of Coast Guard personnel on joint staffs. A third reason may be that the Navy may not be able to obtain the Coast Guard when requested.

#### **ADDITIONAL COAST GUARD MISSION CAPABILITIES**

Five areas of consideration for better Coast Guard utilization include counterinsurgency, blockade and quarantine, mine warfare, crisis response, and forward presence.

Counterinsurgency and Blockade/Quarantine: Two likely missions for naval forces of the future are counterinsurgency, and blockade or "quarantine." The Coast Guard proved in Vietnam during OPERATION MARKET TIME its effectiveness in these areas. An insurgency in any country with a coastline can in part be countered by the use of naval power. Sea power can be applied in any number of ways; to prevent infiltration by sea, to conduct inland riverine operations, to transport troops, provide gunfire support, and conduct psychological warfare in the form of medical treatment, propaganda leaflets and loudspeaker comms.<sup>26</sup> Of particular importance is the need to be completely effective in stopping infiltration. The Coast Guard is ideal for the insurgencies we are likely to experience as developing third world countries and new democracies continue to spring up

around the globe.

Mine Warfare: The cheapest and one of the easiest ways to neutralize a sea power is through mine warfare. The Coast Guard offers an inexpensive way to interdict and eliminate the minelayers. If too late or unsuccessful, the mine countermeasure ships can be escorted by the Coast Guard at a lower risk than the FFG's. In addition, the Coast Guard could be used to seed our own minefields in enemy coastal regions.<sup>27</sup> The Coast Guard currently has coastal patrol boats that can perform this mission as well as new Buoy Tenders that also have this capability.

Crisis Response: Another aspect of the littoral region where the Coast Guard might be employed is crisis response. Examples include, but are not limited to noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), where the Coast Guard lands a small force, gathers the evacuees, and departs quickly. This was demonstrated in 1989 by Coast Guard units following civil unrest in St Croix, USVI, as well as in response to the 1980 Cuban exodus where the Coast Guard helped ensure the safety of over 117,000 people and 5000 vessels.

Forward Presence: At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the Coast Guard is an outstanding forward presence vehicle, particularly when involved in training, diplomacy and security assistance. Because the Coast Guard must communicate with both sophisticated naval systems and low-technology commercial and pleasure craft, the Coast Guard also has wide-ranging capability for working with others. Most navies of the world more closely resemble the U.S. Coast Guard than the U.S. Navy. Similarly, an unidentified CINC stated:

When regional tensions heighten, the presence of a multimission Coast Guard cutter or contingent is often less threatening to Host Nation sovereignty concerns than a DOD asset would be simply because it is not perceived as U.S. "military" presence. Yet, that presence still demonstrates U.S. commitment to our allies and can be an

effective deterrent to aggression.<sup>28</sup>

Such was exactly the case following the 1983 operation in Grenada. Although not a part of the invasion force, a squadron of Coast Guard vessels assembled and deployed to help pick up the pieces and assist the Navy in its two part mission: to prevent the escape of wanted Marxist fugitives or the infiltration of subversives, weapons or any other military contraband, and to display a continuing U.S. commitment by a naval presence. Reassuring Grenadians of their continued security was vital to creating a stable government and a functioning economy.<sup>29</sup> The vessels sent by the Coast Guard were ideal since they were seaworthy, fast, well armed, and small enough for inshore work, while large enough to self deploy across the Caribbean.<sup>30</sup>

The recent deployment of USCGC DALLAS to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea showed that countries not quite ready to have U.S. Navy forces in their waters, eagerly trained and exercised with the U.S. Coast Guard. These countries included Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Tunisia, Slovenia, and Albania.

#### **ALTERNATIVES TO UTILIZING THE U.S. COAST GUARD IN DOD MISSIONS IN SHALLOW WATER LITTORAL REGIONS**

"Forward...From the Sea" states in its contents the views on what might be foreseen in the future for the Navy's surface fleet.

...our basic "building blocks" remain Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups-with versatile, multipurpose, naval tactical aviation wings-and Amphibious Ready Groups with special operations-capable Marine Expeditionary Units...forward deployed surface warships-cruisers and destroyers-with theater ballistic missile defense capabilities will play an increasingly important role in discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missiles by extending credible defenses to friendly and allied countries.<sup>31</sup>

Absent from this tailored forces scenario is a self sustaining coastal patrol boat. This probably is not by oversight. The U.S. Navy does not have one in the inventory. The Coast Guard has many cutters that could fit this requirement. It seems one lesson of

Vietnam has been forgotten. The need for and utility of coastal patrol boats, like the Coast Guard WPB's that served so well in Vietnam, is still there.

Navy Patrol Boats: The Navy has made an attempt to produce a class of 16 patrol boats, the "Cyclone," designed to replace the overaged PB-MK III for use by Naval Special Warfare. These boats are large for coastal work, drawing 8 feet of water and 170 feet long. Because of their size, the final three of the original 16 planned were not built, in part because it was belatedly discovered that they were too large for the inshore work for which they were intended.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, the patrol boat cupboard is bare for the U.S. Navy. Although Special Operations has the new 69' MK IV Patrol Boats, these boats are not self sustaining and are used primarily for short periods of time. The void still exists twenty-five years after Vietnam, even as the Navy comes "Forward...From the Sea." Also like twenty-five years ago, the Coast Guard has a credible patrol boat fleet and is ready for the call. Incredibly, there is still significant resistance to this idea. Within the Coast Guard, there is some irritation that it is another example of "a mission that the Navy doesn't want, but won't let others acquire."<sup>33</sup> The Coast Guard prides itself on its boat expertise and experience. If there is any warfare resource that the Coast Guard could and should justifiably and logically provide, it is capability for coastal warfare.<sup>34</sup>

Assistance From Other Nations: There are numerous other nations that can provide the appropriate patrol craft. For example, the Argentine Navy provided four fast patrol boats to a UN observer mission in the Gulf of Fonseca.<sup>35</sup> This was an interesting exercise in that the patrol boats were painted white, flew the UN flag, and were unarmed.

Use of Civilian Agencies/Companies: The U.S. Navy could contract civilian companies or agencies to do some littoral patrol functions. An example is the Maritime Environmental Pollution arena. Many commercial companies were hired to assist in the cleanup of oil



purposely dumped by Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis. Although the Coast Guard oversaw this operation, the Operational Commander does have the option to work with commercial companies and other agencies of the U.S. Government for assistance in the cleanup of maritime environmental disasters. Some problems encountered may be contracting strategic mobility assets, reliability and availability of assets, and the fact that some may not enter threat areas.

Port Security/Law Enforcement: The Navy could also take over the role of port security, currently filled by the U.S. Coast Guard Reserves. The Reserves are trained in this mission area and were activated to perform this mission in the Persian Gulf and Haiti. The Navy is neither trained nor staffed to currently take over this mission.

The Navy does not have an equivalent of a law enforcement or maritime boarding teams. These features are unique to the Coast Guard due to its domestic missions and probably could not be duplicated on the outside. Posse Comitatus prohibitions also restrict DOD forces from performing domestic law enforcement missions.

Although the Navy may be able to temporarily fill some missions that the Coast Guard performs, in the long run, it may be difficult for the Navy to consistently perform these missions without degradation to other mission areas.

### **REALITIES THAT DRIVE COAST GUARD OPERATIONS**

In the study done by Captain Stubbs, he found that while the Coast Guard is well equipped to contribute to the National Security Strategy in such broad areas as humanitarian assistance, maritime law enforcement, security assistance, port and coastal defense, and environmental protection, it lacks specific national defense tasking and has not been as well integrated with the other components of our military forces as desirable.<sup>36</sup>

A fundamental issue for the Coast Guard is who will pay for the national security

capabilities. The Coast Guard needs acceptance both internally and externally (Congress and Administration) of its engagement role. The process of defining the role must be framed by the assessment of what level of effort is acceptable to both political and congressional leadership. Additionally, the Coast Guard lacks a Commandant White Paper on the Coast Guard's Engagement Role. Such a policy paper would guide Coast Guard engagement activities, provide terms of reference for conducting these efforts, and drive development of a Coast Guard Strategic International Plan.<sup>37</sup>

The Coast Guard's recent responses to the threat of mass migrations from Cuba and Haiti are good examples of both the strength and weakness of the service. As a small, multimission organization, the Coast Guard has the capability to rapidly direct resources for a surge response to stabilize an emergency situation, be it humanitarian, law enforcement, military, or environmental. Thus, the compactness of its operating force and support infrastructure make it difficult for the Coast Guard to commit numerous resources on a continuing basis.<sup>38</sup>

In 1994, then Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Kime, suggested that continued heavy involvement in migrant interdiction operations off Haiti created problems for the Coast Guard. He indicated the operations absorbed all of the Atlantic Area fleet normally used for Law Enforcement and Search and Rescue.<sup>39</sup> This statement acknowledges the fact that continuing operations in alien migrant interdiction effected the other domestic missions the Coast Guard performed as would increased support to DOD requirements. Over the long run, the Coast Guard cannot afford the degradation of these other domestic missions.

## CONCLUSION

With global changes in the balance of power, the shift to regional focus, and the downsizing of DOD, the need for optimizing all resources has never been more essential. Although the Coast Guard is a proud naval service, it is not the U.S. Navy. The naval component commander of any CINC is going to view the Coast Guard as having different skills from those of the Navy or the Marine Corps units under his or her command. This is just and acceptable.

However, the Coast Guard is more than a situational resource. In our history, the U.S. has formally declared war on three occasions. It is only when "the President directs or in time of war" that the Coast Guard transfers to the Navy. Undoubtedly, as the global threat has diminished, the likelihood that tomorrow will bring regional conflicts and crisis responses will grow. With that scenario, the inclusion of the Coast Guard is important for its unique, broader national security capabilities. The Coast Guard should be incorporated in standing plans, exercises, and operations with DOD counterparts. The Coast Guard brings many capabilities for use by the Operational Commander in areas the U.S. Navy is unable to fill. The Coast Guard can give the CINCs flexibility with crisis response. With the Navy's "rightsizing" of its service, now is the time to plan for the Coast Guard in key mission areas and not wait until the situation occurs where the Coast Guard is called upon as an afterthought. This preplanning would additionally assist the Coast Guard with long range planning and training for National Security missions. The need for unity of effort by both services to not only plan, but to someday execute truly joint operations is more important today than ever before, and without it, both services may struggle in distress.

FIGURE 1

# COAST GUARD MISSION AREAS AND FUNCTIONS

NATIONAL MARITIME SAFETY FUNCTIONS	NATIONAL MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL FUNCTIONS	NATIONAL MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS	POLITICAL MILITARY FUNCTIONS
AIDS TO NAVIGATION	MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE	ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND TREATIES	NAVAL WARFARE
SEARCH & RESCUE	PORT SAFETY & SECURITY	PORT SAFETY AND SECURITY NON-MILITARY	
POLAR ICE OPS			
WATERWAYS MGMT			
COMMERCIAL VESSEL SAFETY			
PORT SAFETY AND SECURITY			
BRIDGE ADMIN			
RECREATIONAL BOATING SAFETY			

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>4</sup> Ibid., Introduction.
- <sup>5</sup> John H. Dalton, Jeremy M. Boorda, and Carl E. Mundy, Jr., "Forward...From the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1994, 46.
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- <sup>8</sup> John Harlee, "Patrol Guerilla Motor Boats," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1964, 71.
- <sup>9</sup> Robert Erwin Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1987, 333.
- <sup>10</sup> Bruce B. Stubbs, The U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century, Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, 1992, 169.
- <sup>11</sup> U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., U.S. Code 14, Title 1, 1989 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1989.)
- <sup>12</sup> U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., U.S. Code 14, Title 2, 1989 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1989.)
- <sup>13</sup> U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., U.S. Code 14, Title 141, 1989 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1989.)
- <sup>14</sup> Stubbs, xxix.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., 53.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>17</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, Navy - Coast Guard Collaboration on Future Cutters, COMLANTAREA Point Papers on Strategic Issues, 20 November 1995.

- <sup>18</sup> Letter 12000 from CINCLANTFLT to Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 2 November 1995.
- <sup>19</sup> FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CINCLANTFLT letter 12000 of 2 Nov 95, 17 November 1995.
- <sup>20</sup> Letter 3500 from Commanding Officer, USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) to Commander, Atlantic Area (Aof) and Commander, Sixth Fleet, 28 August 1995, 9.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 1.
- <sup>22</sup> Memorandum of Agreement Between DOD and the DOT On the Use of the U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy, Washington, D.C., October 3, 1995.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., Annex A.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., Annex B.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., Annex C.
- <sup>26</sup> Andrew G. Nelson, and Normal G. Mosher, "Proposed: A Counterinsurgency Task Force," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1966, 38.
- <sup>27</sup> Herbert A. Black, and Christopher A. Abel, "Missing the Boat," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1988, 58.
- <sup>28</sup> Stubbs, 174.
- <sup>29</sup> Dale L. Thompson, "The Guard in Grenada," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1984, 66.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 67.
- <sup>31</sup> "Forward...From the Sea," U.S. Navy White Paper, October 1994, 3.
- <sup>32</sup> Bernard Prezelin, Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, 1993.
- <sup>33</sup> Stubbs, 95.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> Juan Carlos Neves, United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations in the Gulf of Fonseca by Argentine Navy Units, Newport: Naval War College Strategy and Campaign Department, 12 January 1993.
- <sup>36</sup> Stubbs, xxiii.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, The Coast Guard's Role in Engagement, COMLANTAREA Point Papers on Strategic Issues, 27 November 1995.

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